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The Finnish Think Tank Landscape – A 
Mixture of Consensualism and Adversity?
Lotta I. Lounasmeri*
As a common feature of Nordic countries, the Finnish landscape of thinks tanks has been popu-
lated by large corporatist interest organisations and government-funded research organisa-
tions. In addition to this, since 2005, party-affiliated think tanks form a notable part of the 
picture. Recently, several small think tanks that are oriented towards specific themes, such as 
international relations, the environment and feminism, have been founded. This article exam-
ines Finnish developments in the field of think tanks with two objectives. First, it gives a general 
overview of the Finnish think tank landscape. Second, by using interview data and public mis-
sion statements of the most prominent think tanks, it explores how these organisations see 
their role in Finnish society. What is their relationship with media and the political machinery, 
and how does this relate to their position and activities as either consensual or adversarial 
actors? It is concluded that redeeming the place of think tanks in the Finnish polity is a con-
tinuing challenge, and resorting to adversarial tactics is not a favourable way to do so. This 
approach has mostly been attempted by neoliberal think tanks that, in the past, have also prof-
ited from corporatist structures to enhance their objectives.
Introduction
A challenge in trying to understand the role of think tanks in society starts 
with defining what a think tank is. The institution has its roots in the United 
States, from where it has travelled across the globe into many countries in 
Europe, including the five Nordic countries, arriving earlier to Sweden and 
Denmark and taking root in Finland only recently and in a more modest 
way (see also Lounasmeri 2016). Each country has its unique landscape in 
this respect, tying in with the political life and culture. Even the Nordic 
countries, often seen as sharing a similar political system and structures, vary 
in this regard. In any one country, factors like historical circumstances, polit-
ical culture, legal traditions and the character of the regime in power have 
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an effect on the think tank landscape (Stone 2007, 261). On a very general 
level, Hart and Vromen (2008, 135) offer a sound definition of think tanks, 
seeing them as institutes producing research-based policy arguments, offer-
ing them in the policymaking process. Kelstrup (2016, 10) has a similar defi-
nition but adds the idea of think tanks claiming autonomy. As for the Finnish 
landscape of think tanks, this does not hold entirely, as party-affiliated or-
ganisations make up a good part of the picture.
A general division is usually made between independent, research-ori-
ented organisations and advocacy think tanks seen as having an explicit 
ideological profile (Weaver 1989). These can include different political lean-
ings and funding derived from substantial private or public donors/funders: 
neoliberal, free market-oriented think tanks, as well as social democratic or 
otherwise politically oriented think tanks. In the Finnish case, very little 
remains between these two categories. Worth mentioning is Demos Helsinki, 
a mixture of a consultancy and research organisation with a versatile fund-
ing base.
The more precise angle to look at think tank activities here is to examine 
their relation with consensual and adversarial mentality and activity – 
whether think tanks see their mission as challenging existing structures or 
building on the existing consensus. In the historically corporatist Nordic 
countries, this is a particularly interesting question. Think tanks may sup-
port or oppose consensus, but how and what they are most likely to do is 
disputed (Campbell & Pedersen 2014; Kinderman 2017). The data presented 
here are qualitative in nature, and the question is approached by analysing 
what think tanks say they do in interviews and in their public communica-
tion (websites). The more specific point was to determine how they position 
themselves in relation to public debate and the media, as well as to the polit-
ical machinery and policymaking. The article is divided into two parts. First, 
the landscape of think tanks in Finland is analysed in terms of the types of 
existing organisations and their background. Second, relying on interviews1 
with the seven most prominent think tanks in Finland and on material col-
lected from their websites,2 the article explores the think tanks’ relationship 
towards the public sphere and politics, as well as how these organisations 
appear in relation to consensus and adversity.
The Landscape of Finnish Think Tanks
The Finnish think tank scene has been mapped by collecting information 
from an international think tank index (https://www.gotot hinkt ank.com/) 
and Finnish public sources on think tanks.3 As a common feature of Nordic 
countries, their landscape of think tanks has been populated by large corpo-
ratist interest organisations and government-funded research organisations. 
In addition, there are several recently found small think tanks that are 
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oriented towards specific themes, such as international relations, the envi-
ronment and feminism.
In contrast to other Nordic countries, in Finland, party-affiliated think 
tanks form a notable part of the picture, as government funding for them 
was initiated in 2005 (see also Lounasmeri 2016). The idea was to renew and 
invigorate representative democracy and the way parties prepare their pol-
icy programmes. Think tanks could bring in new insights and ideas from the 
fields of research, product development and organisational knowledge 
(Turunen 2005). This was tied to the more general, global development of 
the weakening ties between parties and the voting citizens. The Finnish 
think tanks associated with political parties include the leftist tanks Kalevi 
Sorsa Foundation, associated with the Social Democratic Party; the Left 
Forum, associated with the Left Alliance; Suomen Toivo (Finland’s Hope), 
associated with the right-wing National Coalition Party; e2, originally asso-
ciated with the Centre Party but now claiming independence; Visio, associ-
ated with the Green Party; Suomen Perusta (Foundation of Finland), 
associated with the Finns Party and Agenda, which is close to the Swedish 
People’s Party RKP; and Kompassi, the Christian Democratic Party’s think 
tank. Agenda along with Magma, which is funded by numerous Finnish-
Swedish foundations, both represent the Swedish-speaking minority’s point 
of view and are liberal in their orientation.
State funding is distributed to think tanks by the Ministry of Education 
and Culture according to election results. The funding, in total, is about 
€600,000 per year, and in 2018, it was divided as follows: e2 Tutkimus: 
€148,000, Suomen Toivo: €145,000, Suomen Perusta: €103,000, Kalevi Sorsa-
säätiö: €98,000, Visio: €34,000, Vasemmistofoorumi: €33,000, Agenda: 
€25,000 and Kompassi: €14,000. In comparison, the direct funding of politi-
cal parties provided by the state in 2018 was €29.6 million. Some of the 
organisations depend quite heavily on state support. For example, in 2015, 
Suomen Toivo received 79 percent of its budget from the state; Visio, 77 
percent; and Suomen Perusta, 67 percent. A report discussing state funding 
indicates that some of the think tanks would cease to function without this 
money; they were actually founded to receive their share of this funding 
(Raivio et al. 2018). There is a variation amongst these organisations, as well; 
Centre Party think tank e2 changed its name to e2 Tutkimus (e2 Research) 
and started to profile itself more as a research institution, taking distance 
from the party affiliation and also finding other avenues of funding.4
Naturally, research organisations have been funded by different interest 
groups in Finnish society, such as trade unions or employers’ organisations, 
but these have not taken a particularly active public role. As in the case of 
Sweden (see the article on Swedish think tanks in this issue), the earliest 
appearance of think tanks in Finland was in the form of research institutes. 
Furthermore, in Norway, there is a large representation of independent 
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research institutes (see the article on Norwegian think tanks in this issue). 
In Finland, these organisations include Pellervo Economic Research 
(Pellervon taloustutkimus, PTT), associated with the Central Union of 
Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners (Maa- ja metsätaloustuottajain 
Keskusliitto) and the Centre Party; the Labour Institute for Economic 
Research (Palkansaajien tutkimuslaitos, PT), associated with the Central 
Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (Suomen Ammattiliittojen 
Keskusjärjestö) and the Social Democratic Party; the Research Institute of 
the Finnish Economy (Elinkeinoelämän tutkimuslaitos, ETLA), funded 
mainly by Finnish employer organisations; and the governmental organisa-
tion Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus VATT, Institute for Economic 
Research. Each organisation prepares evaluations and forecasts concerning 
the national economy. In addition, numerous sectoral research institutes 
exist, some of which are affiliated with universities. Others worth mention-
ing include the Finnish Institute of International Affairs FIIA 
(Ulkopoliittinen instituutti, UPI), funded by the Finnish Parliament; the 
non-government organisation Crisis Management Initiative, founded by 
Martti Ahtisaari; and Sitra, the Finnish Innovation Fund, a public founda-
tion. All these organisations are research oriented and aim at developing 
and having a societal impact in Finland or internationally. In some interna-
tional rankings, ETLA and UPI have been ranked as some of the most influ-
ential Finnish think tanks.
Apart from research organisations, the oldest organisation labelled now-
adays as a think tank in Finland is Elinkeinoelämän valtuuskunta (EVA), a 
liberal pro-market advocacy think tank founded in 1974 with funding from 
employers’ organisations, such as Elinkeinoelämän keskusliitto (EK) and 
Teollisuuden Keskusliitto, as well as private corporations and businesses. 
EVA shares a board and funding with ETLA, and the organisations work in 
close cooperation. Another front-runner is Demos Helsinki, a non-aligned 
think tank with its original sister organisation based in the UK, claiming to 
have brought the think tank phenomenon to Finland. Demos Helsinki 
describes itself as a future-oriented think tank working for a democratic and 
sustainable society. It has a large funding base and conducts much project 
work that is publicly funded.
Liberal or leftist think tanks are outspoken about their leanings. EVA 
describes its aim as ‘to identify and evaluate trends that are important for 
Finnish companies and for the long-term success of the society as a whole’ 
(http://www.eva.fi/en/eva/). Finland’s Hope declares that it is a political 
think tank based on party activity and that it reflects a National Coalition 
worldview in its major themes (https://toivo ajatu spaja.fi/mika-toivo/). As 
for the think tanks associated with leftist political parties, the Kalevi Sorsa 
Foundation profiles itself as ‘describing and contributing to the conversa-
tion on what kind of social democratic policies combine freedom and justice 
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with equality, also in the long term’ (http://sorsa found ation.fi/en/). The Left 
Forum says it is ‘building a collaborative network sharing a leftist set of val-
ues and extending from political parties to universities, research institutions 
and expert organizations’ (http://www.vasem misto fooru mi.fi/en/leftf orum/). 
As a summary, all the advocacy and non-aligned think tanks are presented 
in Table 1.
A quantitative Nordic media analysis in 2016 showed that compared with 
the press coverage of think tanks in other Nordic countries, especially 
Denmark, that in Finland was small, with samples from 2006 and 2013 
(Lounasmeri 2016). This was partly due to the recent founding of think 
tanks in Finland, but the situation has not radically changed, as can be seen 
from the Table 2. EVA, which had most of the public attention (89 percent) 
in the studied material in 2006 and 2013, has had to share its portion with 
other players in the field, on the basis of the figures from recent years in the 
largest Finnish daily, Helsingin Sanomat. At the same time, the overall cov-
erage continues to be modest.
History of Consensual Policymaking in Finland: 
Mixing Corporatism with Neoliberal Ideas
The ideas that think tanks present and the ways how they operate can be 
examined in relation to upholding consensus and cooperation or question-
ing and maybe even challenging the status quo in different ways. This can 
include using adversarial communication in public or questioning the func-
tioning of existing corporatist structures. Theoretically, consensus can be 
seen as tied to institutional structures and decision-making processes, which 
is related to the corporatist model that is traditionally prevalent in Nordic 
countries. Another way of looking at consensus is seeing it more as a cul-
tural and communicative phenomenon, in which a will to find a common 
ground and eliminate or downgrade political differences is emphasised 
(Lounasmeri 2010, 25–26).
The landscape of think tanks can be seen against the backdrop of recent 
societal developments that have affected all Nordic countries. These include 
the much-discussed decline of corporatism and the rise of lobbyism and 
the so-called consultant democracy (see, e.g., Kuusela & Ylönen 2013 for 
the Finnish case), as well as the phenomenon of mediatisation, implying the 
growing role of the media logic in political processes. There is evidence 
implying that the phenomenon of de-corporatisation might not hold for all 
the five Nordic countries, the notable exceptions being Finland (Vesa et al. 
2018) and Iceland (Óskarsdóttir 2018). Other factors also influence the way 
think tanks have been able to establish themselves as actors in policy pro-
cesses. In the introduction to this theme issue, Kelstrup mentions the 
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availability of funding and the role of political culture. Both of these factors 
seem to be relevant in the Finnish case.
Taking a look at past developments since the 1970s, especially EVA’s role 
in them, is necessary to understand how consensus and corporatism play a 
role in today’s Finnish political environment. When EVA was established in 
1974, it was a part of a wave of neoliberal think tanks established in Western 
countries (Wuokko 2019). Maiju Wuokko (2019), an economic historian, 
has analysed how EVA and the Finnish business community in the 1970s 
and 1980s actually used corporatist institutions and consensual policymak-
ing traditions to advance neoliberal policies – these functioned as useful 
avenues to advance business interests, not necessarily as important values in 
themselves. An important moment in this respect was the Korpilampi 
Conference in 1977, in which in the spirit of consensus and in the name of 
national competitiveness, tax cuts on corporations and a suspension in wage 
increases were agreed upon (Saari 2010, 475). This was proceeded by the 
close cooperation between EVA and the more right-leaning Social 
Democrats. An important memo on competitiveness was produced for 
Korpilampi by an official of the Ministry of Finance, the Social Democrat 
Raimo Sailas, who also drafted the welfare cuts during the 1990s severe eco-
nomic recession. Thus, the alliances and concepts that built the 1990s con-
sensus were already established in the 1970s (Lounasmeri & Ylä-Anttila 
2014, 67). At the heart of the Finnish consensus lay the idea of the impor-
tance of competitiveness, with the national interest demanding an adjust-
ment to economic necessities (Kettunen 2006, 309). Furthermore, Wuokko 
(2019) sees that the neoliberal trend has since persisted: ‘Finnish welfare, 
consensus, and labour market policies have since the 1990s been developed 
along the lines advocated by business already in the previous decades’. The 
idea of redefining the state as a coaching state, promoting competition and 
neoliberal reform, has been found by several Finnish scholars (e.g., Kantola 
& Kananen 2017). Thus, the commitment towards consensual policymaking 
might still be found, as long as it proves to be a practical tool for enhancing 
specific policies.
A look into how neoliberal policies have been adopted in different 
regions shows that in Northern European countries, they have been applied 
whilst preserving the welfare state ideology, progressive taxation and corpo-
ratist industrial relations at the same time (Ban 2016; 8, 14–15; also Greve 
2007; Ryner 2007). Other evidence suggests that in the Swedish case, neo-lib-
eral think tanks have challenged Swedish corporatism from the mid-1970s 
and in the 2000s (Kinderman 2017). In an effort to find a more nuanced 
view vis-à-vis corporatism, Vesa et al. (2018) have analysed the recent devel-
opments of the system in Finland, comparing them with those in Denmark 
and the UK. Vesa et al. make four important findings based on surveys of 
both interest group representatives and civil servants in Finland. First, 
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although the official committee institution has been largely dismantled 
(Rainio-Niemi 2010), working groups and other extra-parliamentary bodies 
are still important in advocating policy processes. Second, public adminis-
tration comes out strong as a site of advocacy in comparison to the govern-
ment and parliament. Third, of the interest groups studied, economic groups 
seem to have an especially strong position. Fourth is the finding related to 
the relevance of resources, which predicted the ability to influence more 
strongly in Finland than in Denmark or the UK. These findings differ in 
many respects from the other Nordic countries and may also explain the 
weaker role and influence of think tanks, in general. Corporatist tendencies, 
as well as administrative routines, continue to have a strong role (Braun 
2013; Vesa et al. 2018).
As for the media’s role in the Finnish polity, it has been attested to many 
times that the relevance of public debate and media attention is not always 
strong when influencing specific policy processes (Kunelius et al. 2009; 
Pfetsch et al. 2014, 95; Lounasmeri 2016). In the US context, Rich (2004, 
139) has stated that the think tanks most widely cited in the media are not 
seen by policymakers themselves as particularly influential. Having said 
this, using adversarial tactics is a way to get public attention and create dis-
cussion, which might affect politics in the long term. At the same time, when 
strong reciprocal ties and a consensual atmosphere prevail, strong support 
and a strong resource base are often needed to be able to enter the spheres 
of influence.
Table 2. Mentions of Think Tanks in Helsingin Sanomat (2014–2018)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total
Party affiliated think tanks
Kalevi Sorsa foundation 12 19 5 9 4 49
e2 Research 4 2 9 13 14 42
Foundation of Finland 0 6 0 1 2 9
Left Forum 1 2 1 1 1 6
Agenda (2016) – – 0 3 3 6
Visio 1 0 0 0 1 2
Finland’s Hope 0 0 0 1 1 2
Kompassi (2018) – – – – 2 2
Other think tanks
EVA 43 62 41 30 27 203
Libera 22 16 25 14 22 99
Demos 10 21 11 12 13 67
Hattu (2015) 5 4 1 4 0 14
SaferGlobe 1 0 4 2 5 12
Magma 0 1 0 4 2 7
Nordic West Office (2017) – – – 3 3 6
Ekvalita 0 0 0 0 1 1
Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 43 – No. 3, 2020 197
© 2020 The Authors. Scandinavian Political Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on 
behalf of Nordic Political Science Association
Think Tanks’ Roles and Strategies
For this research, the representatives of the following seven most prominent 
Finnish think tanks (excluding traditional research organisations) at the 
time were interviewed: EVA, Demos Helsinki, Kalevi Sorsa Foundation, 
Left Forum, Libera, Finland’s Hope and e2. The interviews conducted were 
semi-structured in nature, relying on certain key themes to be discussed, but 
also giving room to new material or perspectives to arise. The websites of 
the interviewed think tanks, in turn, were searched to find all the mentions 
about the missions, goals and tasks of the organisations in question. Both 
materials were analysed by using a qualitative content analysis approach 
(Mayring 2000), creating meaningful categorisations derived from the re-
search question. The particular approach used here can also be called di-
rected, as the analysis starts from a theoretical viewpoint using relevant 
research findings as guidance (Hsieh & Shannon 2005). The material was 
organised thematically in an effort to see how the representatives of the 
think tanks see their organisations’ role in Finnish society and the kinds of 
operation modes they deem most appropriate. The main categorisations 
were (1) the role of publicity and the media, and communication with poli-
cymakers, (2) the role of research versus keeping up with the day-to-day 
agenda and (3) the organisations’ perceived relationship with adversity and 
consensus.
Realising that relying on these organisations’ own declarations of their 
mission needs a critical examination, the analysis is presented bearing this in 
mind; examples in which contradictory evidence has been found are also 
provided.
The Role of Different Channels in Think Tanks’ Life – Publicity and the 
Political Machinery
Think tanks affiliated with political parties use both channels – publicity 
and political machinery – but as they do not get much media publicity, they 
seem to invest their scarce resources more into doing affluence work that 
happens in the background. This includes giving advice and background ma-
terials to not only politicians and other decision-makers but also to journal-
ists, in this way influencing the public discussion without being explicitly 
mentioned in the press.
And well… what of course is not visible in public… is that to a certain extent, we give back-
ground information to the media. Meaning giving an expert’s input to a journalist who is 
writing on a certain subject. (A party-affiliated think tank representative)
Party-affiliated think tanks describe themselves as working in the inter-
section of research and political decision-making, and to some extent public 
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discussion. The Left Forum announces that it is directly involved in develop-
ing the party programme.
EVA has been successful in actively using both channels, influencing policy-
makers, but also public debate. The organisation has managed to build an 
established position in mainstream media over the course of a long period (see 
also Lounasmeri 2016). It has built close relations with decision-makers, upheld 
by personal networks and resources that allow organising exclusive events. It 
also tries to reach politicians more directly, as is evident with its guidebook for 
parliamentarians initiative (2019). EVA hoped to distribute it to everyone run-
ning in the elections in spring 2019, an ambitious plan reflecting its apparent 
self-confidence in being a credible authority within Finnish politics.
Influencing in the background raises a problem when trying to measure 
the influence of think tanks based on the amount of mentions of the media. 
Still, political party think tanks are active in producing knowledge in the 
form of research-based publications, pamphlets and blog texts. For example 
the Left Forum succeeded for an eight-year period to regularly give out the 
publication series Peruste, despite the modest visibility of the publication 
and the think tank itself, in mainstream media. However, the Left Forum 
decided to discontinue the publication in 2018 in order to allocate its scarce 
resources into doing research.
For some privately funded think tanks, media platforms (old and new) that 
are open for the public seem to play a crucial role. Libera, a pro-market think 
tank founded in 2011, focuses on the creative usage of social media to get its 
message through to both mainstream media and decision-makers. Libera’s 
strategy is built on the presumption that times have changed, that decision-mak-
ers actively follow debate on social media and are influenced by their content, 
or alternatively are exposed to such content when mainstream media pick it up.
For Demos Helsinki, the media also plays an important role in communi-
cating its ideas; Demos Helsinki has consciously built up a brand since its 
beginning. This brand-building project depends also on media coverage. 
However, for Demos Helsinki, the relation with the media and with deci-
sion-makers is more versatile. It has collaborations with ministries, cities, 
universities and private companies. According to the interview, its influence 
on society happens most importantly through the concepts it has succeeded 
to introduce and popularise. According to Demos Helsinki, it has succeeded 
in directing the distribution of funding by affluent governmental institutions 
to new directions. Although these claims are believable, this type of indirect 
impact of think tanks is quite difficult to measure or verify.
Role of Research versus Reacting to the Day-to-Day Agenda
Think tanks affiliated with political parties stress in the interviews their role 
as providers of objective research for decision-makers. These think tanks, 
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publicly perceived as more or less mouthpieces to political parties, seem to 
strive to present themselves as independent actors producing knowledge.
– there is often this kind of assumption that they [party-affiliated think tanks] are advocacy 
types of organizations. And that can become a hindrance; for the media, they do not want to 
go along and propagate a party’s view. – Of course, some of these think tanks deny that they 
have anything to do with parties, but appearing as totally neutral is maybe more of a mar-
keting ploy so that this kind of label would not hamper their activities. – for example, they 
might have other quarters than party representatives on their board, but these think tanks 
were originally founded to develop representational democracy and the party system. (A 
party-affiliated think tank representative)
A comparison of the strategies of Finnish privately funded think tanks with 
party-affiliated ones seemingly shows that the former are closer to the prac-
tices and modes of operation that drive the mediatised, fast-track, competitive 
and pluralist idea of a think tank captured by McGann (2019, 20–21):
To remain relevant and impactful, think tanks and policy institutes must simultaneously 
pursue rigor, innovation, accessibility and accountability more than ever before. In short, 
think tanks must adapt and innovate by transforming their organization to be smarter, bet-
ter, faster and more mobile … The traditional academic-centric model has ended.
What might be true in Anglo-Saxon countries or larger Western European 
countries can find a different landscape in a remote small country of the 
North with a tradition of conservative public discussion and a democratic 
corporatist decision model of decision-making. Furthermore, the political 
culture emphasising consensus and rational technical expertise play a part 
here. In the Finnish public debate, objectivity is a high value, especially when 
it comes to research, and reaching a credible position seems difficult when a 
think tank is identified strongly with a political party. The media almost seem 
to have no category for these actors. An interesting case in this respect is e2, 
nowadays e2 Research, formerly affiliated with the Centre Party. This think 
tank has publicly announced its secession from the Finnish think tank scene 
and has reformulated its organisational identity and brand as a research insti-
tution. It has also stressed its independence from party politics. In an inter-
view two years before its official reformulation, its representative already 
stressed that ‘the Centre party is just one of our 37 partners we cooperate 
with. The relationship is not close’. After taking distance to the Centre Party, 
it seems that e2 has increased its publicity in the largest Finnish newspaper, 
Helsingin Sanomat, in 2017–2018 (see Table 2). During this period, e2 was 
mentioned more than 25 times, which is more than the number of mentions 
of the other party-affiliated think tanks combined. Whether this visibility in 
Helsingin Sanomat is a result of the organisation’s restructuring, its public 
distancing from the Centre Party, the quality of publications and research, its 
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media strategy or some other reason would need in-depth analysis. Still, this 
poses a question on whether being identified as a think tank is something 
beneficial from the point of view of getting publicity in mainstream media. 
This seems like a sound conclusion to make in light of the interviews; it was 
repeatedly stated that being affiliated with a political party or having an 
ideological background makes it more difficult to be heard by the media. 
Comments from different ends of the think tank spectrum attest to this:
… I was recruited outside of politics, having a background as an academic researcher. The 
idea was… to have societal credibility, as a societal actor of its own right and not that the 
organization is an extension of the party office political department. (A party-affiliated 
think tank representative)
… the name Elinkeinolämän valtuuskunta is a bit problematic from the point of view of 
trying to be identified as a think tank. It makes us seemingly a part of EK [Elinkeinoelämän 
keskusliitto, an employers’ organization]. (EVA’s representative)
The media rather acknowledges actors with a more objective position, 
which, for one, can point to the direction of research institutes.
Typically party-affiliated think tanks do not have a large staff, and in 
many cases they commission research reports from outside experts. They 
also produce a lot of analyses and pamphlets. Here there is some variation 
though. Kalevi Sorsa foundation and the Left Forum have each 2–3 research-
ers working for them, plus the leader who has a research background, as 
opposed to Toivo and Libera, who use a large pool of experts to raise issues 
on the agenda. EVA cooperates closely with the research institute Etla. e2 
and Demos Helsinki profile themselves most as research or expert organi-
sations: e2 has seven researchers with specialisation areas, and Demos 
Helsinki employs 45 experts or consultants. As e2 seems to emphasise the 
academic background of its staff, Demos Helsinki says its people represent 
the fields of social science, economy, engineering, philosophy and design, 
but does not give further details on their education. As for the focus of the 
think tanks’ research and analyses, the left leaning are more global in their 
orientation, as the right leaning ones present a more national outlook and 
themes more to do with national party politics, economic and tax policies. e2 
deals a great deal with identity questions, and Demos Helsinki takes an 
seemingly neutral approach above traditional dividing lines in the Finnish 
society. Demos has divided its organisation into a consultancy, Demos 
Helsinki, and a non-profit subsidiary concentrating on academic research, 
Demos Helsinki Research Institute.
Challenging the Status Quo or Upholding a Consensual Balance?
Taking the position of a challenger in public discussion is not a favoured 
strategy of the interviewed party-affiliated think tanks. Traditionally, to give 
Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 43 – No. 3, 2020 201
© 2020 The Authors. Scandinavian Political Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on 
behalf of Nordic Political Science Association
controversial or provocative statements, an actor has had to have a very es-
tablished position in society. EVA has created a strong position for itself and 
is able to challenge existing views by making bold statements. For the oth-
ers, it seems rather difficult. Finnish think tanks generally do not choose to 
be competitive in the public arena but rather influence through their re-
ports, events and background contacts with both journalists and politicians. 
In the interviews, establishing a credible, even respected, position seemed 
important. In the long term, being controversial was not considered a good 
strategy. Even if making radical statements would give a think tank media 
attention, this was not seen as a sustainable approach. Demos Helsinki em-
phasised that giving provocative statements is not a desirable thing to do 
when trying, at the same time, to join projects in the public sector. Some 
notable exceptions exist. The liberal think tanks EVA and Libera, backed 
up by private funding by companies, issue adversarial or contested state-
ments in an effort to steer and push the public discussion to a certain direc-
tion. The role of economics in political decision-making is brought in heavily 
by EVA, which, in 2017, launched a new project with ETLA called The 
Economist Machine (Ekonomistikone), a Finnish economist panel that is an 
‘independent and academic expert panel’ with the goal to ‘increase the soci-
etal role of research in economics, and the usage of research results in deci-
sion making’ (http://www.ekono misti kone.fi/tieto a-konee sta/). The partners 
in the project included VATT, PT and PTT. All professors and associate pro-
fessors in economics, as well as other economists, were invited to join the 
panel. The model for this project was borrowed from IGM Economic 
Experts Panel in the US, a nationwide panel consisting of leading econo-
mists. In the spring of 2019, EVA has also published the Guide for the New 
Members of Parliament, with the aim of distributing it to every candidate in 
the parliamentary elections. The publication aspires to define what eco-
nomic liberalism means in today’s society.
As an example of adversarial tactic, Libera has recently filed a complaint 
with the EU Commission against the Finnish state, which it sees as breaking 
EU regulation in labour market issues (Kuikka 2018). There is also an indi-
cation that small, recently sprung-up think tanks take a different avenue; for 
instance, Hattu, a feminist think tank, uses unpolished language to question 
the unequal aspects of the current status quo in society and carries out proj-
ects to empower women and other underprivileged groups in society (http://
hauto mohat tu.fi/).
All the interviewed think tanks seemed to agree that the best route is to 
base their activity on persistency and long-term influence. This was also 
seen as an advantage and privilege compared with political parties that need 
to make quick statements. As Abelson (2009) has stated, in the case of think 
tanks, visibility is not power, but practically influencing a process is. At least, 
the party-affiliated think tanks seem to go towards the direction of the 
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well-established research institutes in Finland (e.g., e2). Think tanks taking 
a more adversarial position and using a more unconventional strategy, such 
as Hattu or Libera, could be seen as a counterweight to this approach that 
pursues credibility by pacing and formality.
In general, it might be true that those think tanks aiming to influence 
specific policy processes might have a conservative appearance in the media. 
As Berry argued in 1977, they would be hesitant to push ideas that might stir 
controversy and sacrifice insider influence as a result. What came through 
across the board in the interviews was that if one aims to have credibility 
and influence in the background, being provocative in public is not a good 
idea. This strategy works for either an old and established player or a more 
radical newcomer with less resources and no direct access to the political 
machinery. Furthermore, if a think tank aims to be involved in public proj-
ects, it should not act in a manner that is too adversarial.
… saying certain things in a provocative manner cannot be an end in itself if we, at the same 
time, aspire to be a part of some public research projects, for example. (A non-aligned think 
tank representative)
With this said, one must still raise the point that when an organisation 
represents strong interests in society, it has much more leverage also in pub-
lic. In the current societal landscape, neoliberal ideas have become so hege-
monic that the organisations representing them, here mostly EVA and 
Libera, which also have considerable private funding, are possibly in a posi-
tion to use adversarial tactics without major negative consequences. 
Attesting to the established position of EVA, at least until recent years, is 
the following statement:
Every time they [EVA] say something, they get huge publicity. Maybe other think tanks 
choose to influence more in the background. (A party-affiliated think tank representative)
However, EVA’s appearances at least in Helsingin Sanomat have a 
downward trend (see Table 2), and it is possible some other think tanks and 
other organisations have taken up part of EVA’s room in the public. In con-
nection with credibility, many interviewees saw the importance of a trust-
worthy front figure. Having a front figure is not only about them giving a 
face to a think tank and its publications, but also ‘cashing in’ the credibility 
they have built up earlier. For privately funded or non-aligned think tanks, 
this seemed to be an even more crucial point, which makes sense because 
they do not have the legitimacy that established research institutes have 
gained or the think tanks affiliated with political parties have been given 
(although it makes them appear biased). In the interviews, Demos Helsinki 
stood out as an exception, as it claimed that it does not want to have any 
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individual leader in public. Whether this is the case in reality is uncertain, as 
the founders Roope Mokka and Aleksi Neuvonen seem to make most of 
the public appearances. Another topic raised in relation to image was the 
name. Both Kalevi Sorsa -säätiö and EVA saw their names as burdens, as 
they carry too many meanings from the past that might distract or confuse 
the public. Furthermore, the name change that e2 (e2 Tutkimus; e2 Research) 
made clearly shows the importance of the name for the brand of the think 
tank. Left Forum and Libera have names that are self-describing and do not 
hide their political position.
The growing importance of social media was highlighted in the inter-
views, but strategies related to this varied. This also suggests differences in 
the relationship with the consensual/adversarial axis. In some think tanks, 
such as Demos Helsinki and Libera, social media activity is already a signif-
icant tool in getting publicity and engaging in discussion; in others, it was 
still considered a challenge, in which the implementation of social media use 
to the routine was still mainly a work in progress. The function of social 
media as a platform in which one needs to react fast to contemporary issues 
seemed to be more problematic for the party-affiliated think tanks. It 
seemed to pose a contradiction to the logic these think tanks operate on – to 
have an impact in the long term by publishing reports and engaging with 
research. Furthermore, EVA highlighted itself in the interview as wanting to 
be an ‘anti-thesis for impulsive ideas’.
To Conclude
In the introduction to this theme issue, Kelstrup sees that think tanks in 
Nordic countries might have both consensual and adversarial roles. 
Referring to earlier research, he sees that think tanks, for their part, uphold 
certain path dependencies in the systems of coordinated market economies. 
As there is a long tradition of coordinating varied interests in these societies, 
think tanks are often expected to support the tradition of consensual policy-
making (Katzenstein 1985; Hall & Soskice 2001; Campbell & Pedersen 
2014; Thelen 2014). In the Finnish political culture, path dependency seems 
to have a strong grip. In light of the historical evidence of a neoliberal proj-
ect using corporatist structures for its benefit, it is possible to conclude that 
corporatism has adapted to new circumstances like the more competitive 
and open economy, instead of being eliminated. However, in Finland, liberal 
think tanks have recently come out with statements encouraging the dis-
mantling of corporatist structures, wishing to dissolve the old consensus. 
This is in line with the findings of Culpepper (2016) and Kinderman (2017). 
They have found that think tanks funded by employer organisations have 
opposed consensual policymaking, promoting neoliberal ideas at the cost of 
broader institutional interests. In the Finnish case, a shift might be occurring 
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in this respect if the old consensual and corporatist structures do not serve 
the neoliberal project any longer.
At the same time, there is still a strong tendency to actually cooperate 
across the board in the party-affiliated scene when seeing consensus from 
the angle of a consensual negotiation culture. This implies a more cultural, 
deeply embedded way of consensual and cooperative way of doing things. 
There are several examples of this; even the think tanks themselves are 
engaging in different cooperative efforts. The project Future Tank for Us All 
(Tulevaisuuspaja meille kaikille) was a collaboration between all the seven 
party-affiliated think tanks, which was a part of Finland’s 100th anniversary 
celebration programme. The project resulted in three discussion events and 
the publication of Seven Views for Finland – Future Visions by Think Tanks 
(2017).
In light of the material studied, the major obstacles for think tanks to 
grow into prominent players in forming public policy might be the political 
culture and structures, conservative media discussion and limited resources. 
The political culture and structures refer to the fact that there is simply not 
much room for new actors in the political scene. This kind of evidence has 
been found in Denmark (see Kelstrup & Blach-Orsten in this volume). 
Christiansen et al.(2010) have concluded that interest organisations have 
such privileged positions in policymaking, and civil society and the public 
sector are seen as so strong and well organised (Campbell & Pedersen 2014) 
that these factors act as barriers to new players in the Danish setting. In 
Iceland, the easy access of major interest groups to policymakers makes it 
less of a priority to find new ways to influence (see Oskarsdottir, the article 
on Icelandic think tanks in this volume).
All in all, Finnish think tanks represent a mix of attitudes when it comes 
to upholding consensus or bringing in competitive elements to disrupt the 
status quo. Liberal, business-funded think tanks tend to question the tradi-
tional structures, and new, more radical entrepreneurs sometimes resort to 
bold public statements as a tactic. The field of party-affiliated think tanks 
still form the majority and are mostly conservative in their moves. As for the 
think tanks’ significance in the long run, changing existing culture and struc-
tures might be slow, but still happening. A probable avenue to enhance their 
role in the Finnish society is sound research.
NOTES
1. The interviews (seven) were conducted in February and March 2016 by master’s 
students as a part of their methodology course in Media and Communication at the 
University of Z’s Department of Social Research. The interview questions, themes and 
the art of conducting elite interviews were discussed and developed in depth by the 
author with the students. All interviews were recorded and transcribed.
2. The categorization was developed in co-operation by the author and research assistant 
Thomas Södergård, who collected and categorized the material.
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3. The www.hs.fi online archive (the largest Finnish daily) search and a Google search 
were performed with the search words ‘ajatuspaja’, ‘ajatushautomo’ and ‘think tank 
Finland’. A report written for the Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture was also 
utilised (Raivio et al. 2018).
4. e2 Research has been categorized as a research institution also by the Ministry for 
Education and Culture since January 2020.
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